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Elections and Divisiveness: Theory and Evidence
Elliott Ash, Princeton University and University of Warwick
Massimo Morelli, Bocconi University and Center for Economic and Policy Research
Richard Van Weelden, University of ChicagoThis article provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of how politicians allocate their time across issues. When
voters are uncertain about an incumbent’s preferences, there is a pervasive incentive to “posture” by spending too much
time on divisive issues (which are more informative about a politician’s preferences) at the expense of time spent on
common-values issues (which provide greater beneﬁt to voters). Higher transparency over the politicians’ choices can
exacerbate the distortions. These theoretical results motivate an empirical study of how Members of the US Congress
allocate time across issues in their ﬂoor speeches. We ﬁnd that US senators spend more time on divisive issues when
they are up for election, consistent with electorally induced posturing. In addition, we ﬁnd that US house members
spend more time on divisive issues in response to higher news transparency.Most citizens want a secure country, a healthy economy, safe neighborhoods, good schools, affordable health care, and good roads, parks, and
other infrastructure. These issues do get discussed, of course, but a disproportionate amount of attention goes to issues like abortion, gun
control, the Pledge of Allegiance, medical marijuana, and other narrow issues that simply do not motivate the great majority of Americans.
—Fiorina, Adams, and Pope (2006, 202)
Can’t we wait on the things that we’re going to yell at each other about and start on the things that we agree on?
—Austan Goolsbee, Meet the Press, August 7, 2011As the above quotes illustrate, there is a widespreadperception that the political process involves exces-sive amounts of time devoted to narrow and divisive
issues. This raises the questions of why politicians spend so
much time on these issues and if, as sometimes argued (e.g.,
Hillygus and Shields 2014), the focus on divisive issues is a
response to electoral pressures. We provide a theoretical and
empirical analysis of the role of electoral pressures in driving
divisive politics.
The ﬁrst contribution of this article is theoretical. We
provide a positive theory of incumbent politicians’ allocation
of time and resources across two policy issues.While common-
values issues are more important to the voters, voters are un-
sure of the politician’s preferences on divisive issues. The pol-
itician has an incentive to overprovide effort on divisive issues,Elliott Ash (etash@princeton.edu) is a visiting scholar at the Center for the
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preferences that make her more attractive to the majority of
voters. Moreover, this incentive to “posture” is stronger with
higher transparency—that is, when voters have more infor-
mation on the politician’s effort choices.
The second contribution is empirical. We construct a
measure of divisive effort for members of the US Congress
using the text of their ﬂoor speeches. We then report two
new empirical ﬁndings. First, we exploit variation in the time
to re-election for US senators to demonstrate that senators
spend more time on divisive issues when elections are more
imminent. Second, we exploit variation in news coverage
based on the overlap between media markets and congres-
sional districts to show that US house members spend more
time on divisive issues when there is greater transparency.Study of Democratic Politics at Princeton University. Massimo Morell
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Volume 79 Number 4 October 2017 / 1269These results are consistent with the theory and provide
empirical evidence of the importance of electorally induced
posturing.
This article builds on a large theoretical literature on pol-
icy distortions due to electoral pressures. In panderingmodels
(e.g., Canes-Wrone, Herron, and Shotts 2001; Maskin and
Tirole 2004), politicians take actions that signal competence
or congruence with the electorate even if they know those
policies are not in the voters’ interest. This can lead politi-
cians to take relatively extreme actions (e.g., Acemoglu, Ego-
rov, and Sonin 2013; Fox and Stephenson 2015) or result in
valuable information of politicians being lost (e.g., Canes-
Wrone and Shotts 2007; Fox 2007;Morelli and VanWeelden
2013). The present article breaks from the previous literature
in its focus on the allocation of effort across different issues,
rather than the choice on a single issue. This approach gen-
erates a novel prediction: electoral pressures will distort pol-
itician effort away from common-values issues toward divi-
sive issues. That is, distortions in policy making may result
not from choices on a given issue but rather from a misallo-
cation of effort across issues toward those that are more di-
visive.1 In turn, this prediction motivates a new empirical
approach, as relative effort across issues cannot be measured
with standarddata sets onpositions taken (e.g., roll call votes).
Our political effort measure is a continuous metric of time
allocated to divisive issues, constructed from congressional
ﬂoor speech.
The logic of the model can be outlined as follows. An in-
cumbent politician decides how to allocate effort across two
issues, a common-values issue and a divisive one. Politicians
and all voters share the same preference on the common-
values issue. On the divisive issue, voter and politician pref-
erencesareheterogeneous. In theﬁrst stageof thegame,voters
observe the incumbent’s effort allocation, draw inferences
about her type, and then vote on whether to re-elect her or
not. Politicians are more likely to be re-elected if they are1. The theoretical literature on a politician’s allocation of time across
issues is relatively small. Aragones, Castaneira, and Giani (2015), Colomer
and Llavador (2011), and Dragu and Fan (2016) all assume ﬁxed policies
and analyze politicians’ attempts to add salience to issues on which their
party has a preexisting advantage. Dragu and Fan (2016) predict that in
two-party elections only the minority party has an incentive to increase
the salience of issues with high heterogeneity in opinions (sometimes even
when the party does not have an expected advantage on that issue), some-
thing distinct from our results on incumbents’ incentive to focus on divisive
issues. More generally, there is a large literature in economics and political
science stemming from Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) on how agents al-
locate effort across tasks. This literature mainly focuses on competence-
signaling rather than preferences-signaling, however. To our knowledge,
none of these papers consider the allocation of effort between divisive and
common-values issues.
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All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms seen to have preferences that are aligned with those of the
majority of the relevant electorate.
Voter uncertainty about politician preferences on divisive
issues, coupled with the potential for policy disagreements in
the next period, motivates politicians to try to signal that
their policy preferences are alignedwith their electorate. They
do this by focusing effort on divisive rather than common-
values issues. We refer to the excessive exertion of effort on
divisive issues at the expense of common-values issues as
posturing. Politicians posture because more highly divided
preferences on an issue mean greater uncertainty about their
preferences, increasing the electoral value of signaling. We
show that even when there exist very important common-
values issues that everybody agrees should be solved ﬁrst,
incumbent politicians overprovide effort on divisive issues to
signal their preferences. Hence, posturing may involve ﬁrst-
period effort allocations that are suboptimal for all voters,
including those who agree with the actions taken on the di-
visive issue.2 The incentive for the politician to signal her
preferences is strongest when re-election concerns are para-
mount and the politician is most conﬁdent of where majority
opinion will be when she comes up for re-election. As voter
preferences may shift over time, this means that the stron-
gest electoral pressures emergewhen the next election ismost
imminent.
With a sufﬁciently strong re-election motive, there is a
pooling equilibrium in which all politicians posture by fo-
cusing on the divisive issue. This equilibrium not only in-
volves distortions in the politician’s behavior; also, since all
politicians take the same action, the voters do not learn any-
thing from these distortions. This means that high levels of
posturing also impede the ability of voters to learn about pol-
iticians and retain those with more aligned policy preferences.
As such, high levels of posturinghaveunambiguouslynegative
welfare consequences. These negative welfare consequences
emerge not due to a misalignment of the positions taken on a
given issue—when the re-electionmotive is strong politicians
always pursue the majority-preferred position on any issue
they address—but rather because important common-values
issues are ignored at the expense of more divisive ones.
In the ﬁrst part of this article, we assume that voters di-
rectly observe the effort allocation chosen by the incumbent
politician. In the second part, we ask what happens when
voters cannot observe politicians’ effort allocation but only2. As has been discussed in the previous literature, electoral pressures
can have both positive and negative effects on politician behavior, and there
is often a friction between incentivizing politicians to implement desirable
policies today and selecting candidates who will implement desirable pol-
icies in the future (e.g., Fearon 1999).
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previous papers on transparency (e.g., Fox 2007; Fox and Van
Weelden 2012; Prat 2005), we provide new results concerning
the allocation of effort across issues.
In our model, increased transparency can have ambigu-
ous effects on politician behavior. Since the actions are more
likely to be observed, transparency can increase the electoral
beneﬁt from socially inefﬁcient posturing.3 And, by increas-
ing posturing, higher transparency can actually decrease the
amount voters learn about politicians fromtheir effort choices.
The intuition is that, as posturing is more advantageous when
effort choices are more transparent, greater transparency in-
creases the likelihood that the equilibrium involves pooling
with all politicians engaging in maximal posturing. So, for ap-
propriate parameters, transparency can be harmful both for
policy making in the current period and for selecting con-
gruent politicians in the future.
These theoretical ﬁndings motivate the empirical analysis
of posturing. We proxy for effort exerted across issues with
the amount of speech dedicated to different issues on the
House/Senate ﬂoor. Our measure of divisive speech is con-
structed from the frequency that politicians of different
parties use particular language (Gentzkow and Shapiro 2010;
Jensen et al. 2012). This measure is needed to capture how
politicians allocate time across different types of issues rather
than just the positions taken in roll call votes. This is impor-
tant because, although electoral pressures cause roll call votes
to be more aligned with the electorate (e.g., Thomas 1985),
looking only at the positions taken in roll call votes cannot
capture the distortions in relative issue emphasis predicted
by our model.
From the theory, we expect effort on divisive issues to in-
crease when the next election is more imminent. To test this
empirically, we use variation in the time to the next election
that arises due to the staggered election cycle in the US Sen-
ate. We ﬁnd that when senators are up for re-election, they
allocate a greater fraction of their ﬂoor speech to divisive
issues relative to earlier in their term. This result is consis-
tent with electorally induced posturing.
In the second part of our empirical analysis, we measure
the effect of greater transparency on divisiveness. The the-
ory has more caveats about the effect of transparency, but it
identiﬁes conditions under which increased transparency
can lead to increased divisiveness. To identify higher trans-
parency empirically, we use the measure for news coverage3. Dan Rostenkowski, the long-time chairman of the House Ways and
Means Committee, shared this concern, arguing that “as much as people
criticize the back room, the dark room, or the cigar or smoke-ﬁlled room,
you get things done when you’re not acting” (Koeneman 2013).
This content downloaded from 035.176
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(2010), which is based on the geographic overlap between
mediamarkets and congressional districts. Although less con-
clusive than the Senate analysis, we ﬁnd evidence that House
members engage in more divisive speech in response to
higher news transparency. This result complements previous
work on the beneﬁts of transparency: for example, Snyder
and Stromberg (2010) ﬁnd that increased transparency in-
creases politician effort, consistent with the predictions of
models of accountability. Here we identify a potential down-
side in terms of how effort is divided across issues.
In sum, we provide a rationale for how electoral pressures
and transparency can incentivize politicians to focus exces-
sive effort on divisive issues and then present empirical ev-
idence in support of that rationale. However, our empiri-
cal results should be of broader interest than as a test of our
model of divisive politics. To the extent that an increased
focus on divisive issues is socially harmful (e.g., Fiorina et al.
2006), our results provide important empirical veriﬁcation
for the argument that electoral pressures can induce distor-
tions in policy making. A large theoretical literature has ex-
plored the risks of socially harmful pandering and the ways
in which increased transparency can exacerbate these distor-
tions (see Ashworth [2012] for an overview), but the em-
pirical literature is much less developed.4 Our results provide
an important step in understanding how electoral pressures
can induce distortions from an empirical perspective.
The article is organized as follows. The next section pre-
sents the model, and the following section analyzes the equi-
librium. The section after that extends the model to heterog-
enous constituencies, while the following section reports the
empirics. The ﬁnal section concludes. An appendix, avail-
able online, includes the proofs of the theoretical results and
additional details on the empirical speciﬁcation.
MODEL
We consider a two-period model in which a politician takes
action to inﬂuence policy in each period, with an election
between periods. See table 1 for a summary of the deﬁnition
of the symbols used in our model. In each period, the in-
cumbent politician has to decide how to allocate effort, or
other scarce resources such as money or personnel, between
two issues, A and B. IssueA is common-values, and all voters4. Pandering is challenging to test empirically, given that its predic-
tions concern the unobservable private information of policy makers.
However, Canes-Wrone and Shotts (2004) and Rottinghaus (2006) provide
some evidence of pandering by showing that, consistent with these models,
politicians are more responsive to public opinion on issues on which voters
are more informed.
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5. We could allow politicians the option to decrease the policy in the
A dimension as well, but this would be uninteresting as all voters and
politicians have a common interest in pA not decreasing. Moreover, while
we assume that the mapping between effort and policy change is the same for
both issues, this is not necessary. We could allow this to be asymmetric—for
example, assuming the probabilities of policy change are a AwA and aB∣wB∣,
respectively—and results would still hold just with additional parameters
and algebra.
Volume 79 Number 4 October 2017 / 1271agree on the preferred policy. Issue B is divisive, and voters
disagree about which policy they would like implemented.
On issue A, the politician allocates effort wA ∈ ½0, 1; on
issue B, the politician chooses wB ∈ ½21, 1. The choice of wB
reﬂects both the amount of effort on issue B (∣wB∣ ∈ ½0, 1)
and whether to spend the time she devotes to B on increas-
ing (wB 1 0) or decreasing (wB ! 0) the policy. We assume
that the politician is constrained to choose wA 1 ∣wB∣ ≤ W,
where W ∈ (0, 2) is her budget of time. We normalize the
status quo policy to be 0 in each dimension, and we assume
that if effortwA is exerted on issueA, the policy will be pA p 1
with probability wA and 0 with probability 12 wA. Simi-
larly devoting effort wB ≥ 0 (wB ! 0) to issue B results inThis content downloaded from 035.176
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms policy pB p 1 (pB p 21) with probability ∣wB∣ and pB p 0
with probability 1 2 ∣wB∣.5
The parameter W is a measure of the power of the ofﬁce
the politician holds. WhenW is small, the politician’s effort is
unlikely to inﬂuence policy; whenW ≈ 2, it is possible for her
to change policy in both dimensions with high probability;
for intermediate values of W, the politician faces a trade-off
where she can inﬂuence policy but may not be able to do
everything she wants. Parameter W is likely to vary across
institutional structures (e.g., the prime minister in a unicam-
eral parliamentary system may have a higher W than the US
president) and across different ofﬁces in the same system (e.g.
a member of Congress or Parliament would have a lower W
than the president or the prime minister).
In addition to caring about policy, voters receive some
additional payoff from having a politician who is high va-
lence—someone who is an able administrator or whom they
like personally. In each period, t ∈ f1, 2g, the stage game
utility of voter i is
2g∣vt 2 pAt ∣2 (12 g)∣x
B
i 2 p
B
t ∣1 v
j
t ,
where pt
A and pt
B are the policies implemented in period t, vt
j
is the valence of politician j who is in ofﬁce in period t, vt and
xiB are the preferred policies in each dimension for voter i, and
g ∈ (0, 1) is the relative importance of the common-values
issue. So vt ∈ f0, 1g reﬂects whether all voters prefer policy
pA p 1 or pA p 0 in period t. Conversely, the voters may be
type xB p 21 or x B p 1, reﬂecting their preferred policy in
dimension B. To keep the analysis simple, we assume that
preferences in dimension B are independent of the state.
In period 1, a strict majority of voters, m1 ∈ (1=2, 1), are
type xiB p 1 and so prefer higher policies in the B dimen-
sion. The assumption that m1 ≥ 1=2 is without loss of gen-
erality, so the meaningful assumption is that the electorate is
not perfectly divided on issue B (m1 ≠ 1=2). The fraction of
type xBi p 1 voters in period 2 ism2, which is uncertain when
the ﬁrst period effort choice is made. We assume Pr(m2 1
1=2)p 12 h and Pr(m2 ! 1=2)p h, where h ∈ ½0, 1=2).
When h 1 0, this means that there is a possibility that ma-
jority opinion on the divisive issue may ﬂip before the next
election, but h ! 1=2means themajority opinion is positively
correlated across periods. The probability h of a reversal inTable 1. Table of SymbolsSymbol MeaningModel section:
A Common-values issue
B Divisive issue
W Politician’s time budget
xiB Preferred policy on divisive issue for voter i
mt Fraction of voters with xiB p 1 at period t
mP Fraction of type 1 politicians
wtA, wtB Effort dedicated to issues A and B in period t
pt
A, pt
B The resulting policy on issues A and B in
period tq Probability that voter preference on common-
values issue is constant in second periodvt
j Valence of elected politician j in period tg Voter preference weight for common-values
issueh Probability that majority preference on divi-
sive issue changes in second periodvt Voter preference on common-values issue in
period tj2 Variance of distribution of politician valence
f Ofﬁce-holding beneﬁt for politician
m Voter’s updated belief that the incumbent is
type 1.
Empirical section:Ejt Election cohort of Senator j in period t
Tjt Transparency measure for Congressman j in
period t
Xjt Control variables for district j in period t
Yjt Divisiveness of congressman speech
ajt District and year ﬁxed effects
b Estimated coefﬁcients on control variables
µjt Error term in the estimating equations
rE , rT Coefﬁcients for election cohort (E) and
transparency (T ) on divisiveness.047.006 on January 30, 2018 01:50:06 AM
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tion: for example, if a senator has to make an effort allocation
decision between a common-values issue and a divisive issue
early in her term, then there are more opportunities for a shift
of majority preferences on the divisive issue (e.g., during the
second half of the six-year term) than if the allocation deci-
sion ismade immediately before the next election. Thismeans
that h is decreasing in time to re-election. Thus, the model’s
prediction when h is high can be interpreted as the prediction
when re-election is well in the future, whereas when h is low,
it can be interpreted as the prediction when the re-election
decision is imminent. This will be important for deriving
comparative statics that we test in our empirical analysis.
We assume that v1p 1 but that the probability that v2p
1 is q ∈ (0, 1). This means that, in the ﬁrst period, voters
prefer a new policy onA, but, with some probability, they will
be content with the status quo policy in the second period.
Our analysis will focus on the behavior of politicians in the
ﬁrst period when they are electorally accountable, and we as-
sume that v1p 1, so voters would beneﬁt from (appropriately
directed) effort on two different tasks. This makes the politi-
cian’s multi-task problem nontrivial. In the second period,
because q ! 1, different types choose different effort alloca-
tions with positive probability, and the politician’s type mat-
ters for voter-payoffs. That q ! 1 captures the uncertainty
about which issues will be important in the future and reﬂects
the possibility the divisive issue could become a central di-
mension of conﬂict.
Finally, we assume that g ∈ (1=2, 1), and so all voters care
more about issue A than issue B. This is not necessary for our
results, but it corresponds to the case where all players prefer
effort to be spent on A, and so there are biases against ef-
fort focused on B. We focus on the case in which g 1 1=2 in
order to provide a theory of why politicians may not address
common-values issues even if they are more important.
Politicians are drawn from a (possibly proper) subset of
the electorate, and so, like the voters, the preferences of the
politicians are homogeneous on the A dimension and het-
erogeneous on the B dimension. We assume that fraction
mP ∈ (1=2, 1) of the politicians are type x B p 1 and that 12
mP are type xB p 21. That is, we do not require the distri-
bution of politician preferences to be the same as those of the
voters, but we do assume that a politician is more likely than
not aligned with the majority of voters. This is likely the most
relevant case given that politicians are voters themselves.66. The assumption that a majority of politicians hold the same policy
preferences as the majority of the period 1 voters plays no role in the
mechanism we consider, but it simpliﬁes the equilibrium selection. If mP !
1=2, then, because type 1 politicians would have more to lose from not
This content downloaded from 035.176
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms The incumbent politician knows her own type, and voters
update their beliefs based on observed incumbent behavior.
Politicians also differ in their valence, and we assume for
simplicity that valence is normally distributed with mean
0 and variance j 2 1 0 across politicians. The politician’s va-
lence is unknown to both the politician and voters initially,
but it is revealed to everyone when the politician is in ofﬁce
regardless of the effort choice. Valence is constant across
periods, so at the time of the election, voters know whether
the incumbent is higher or lower valence than they can expect
from a challenger. As the incumbent does not know her own
valence initially, it cannot affect her effort choice, but it in-
troduces additional randomness that smooths the re-election
probability. In addition to having preferences over policy, the
politician receives a positive beneﬁt f from being in ofﬁce.
So the stage game utility of politician j if (pAt , p
B
t ) is imple-
mented is
f2 g∣vt 2 pAt ∣2 (12 g)∣xBj 2 pBt ∣,
if they are in ofﬁce, and, if politician k ≠ j is in ofﬁce,
2g∣vt 2 pAt ∣2 (12 g)∣xBj 2 pBt ∣1 vkt :
If out of ofﬁce, a politician is then identical to a voter with
the samepolicypreferences, but inofﬁce, she receives abeneﬁt
f from holding ofﬁce regardless of her own valence. The pa-
rameter f could include monetary and nonmonetary re-
wards from being elected. For simplicity, we assume that ef-
fort is not costly for the elected politician—the incentives to
exert costly effort by incumbent politicians have been studied
in the previous literature.
The game is repeated with discount factor d ∈ (0, 1. Af-
ter the ﬁrst period, voters update their beliefs about the type
of the politician. As there are only two types, these beliefs can
be characterized by
m ≡ Pr(xBj p 1),
the voters’ beliefs that the incumbent is type 1. The timing is
as follows:
1. In period 1, a politician is randomly selected to be
in ofﬁce for that period. The politician knows her
own type, but voters only know the type distribu-
tion.
2. The politician decides how to allocate effort (wA and
wB). There are two subcases:securing re-election, it is possible, for some parameters, to support other
equilibria in which there is additional costly signaling to convince the voters
that the re-election motive is strong.
.047.006 on January 30, 2018 01:50:06 AM
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,
,
.a. The voters observe the effort decision—
transparency case.
b. Voters do not observe the effort decision—
no transparency case.
3. The incumbent’s valence v j is realized and publicly
observed. The politician’s valence is constant across
periods.
4. The policies are determined, with all players receiv-
ing their utilities for period 1. Voters observe pA and
pB and update beliefs about the incumbent.
5. Fraction m2 is realized, and an election takes place
by majority rule over whether or not to re-elect the
incumbent. If the incumbent is not re-elected, a ran-
dom replacement is drawn.
6. v2 is realized, and the politician decides how to al-
locate effort in period 2.
7. The policy is realized, with all players receiving their
payoff for period 2.
Notice that we specify the game so that the status quo in
period 2 is not affected by the outcome in period 1. This sim-
pliﬁes the algebra. It is also the natural assumption if new
policy issues arise each period and preferences are correlated
across the issues faced in different periods. Moreover, we dem-
onstrate in the next subsection that assumptions about the
second period status quo do not drive the results.
Finally, before proceeding to the analysis, note that we
have assumed that the election takes place by majority rule,
and we have abstracted from parties or the selection of can-
didates. However, an alternative application of our model is
to primary elections. Suppose that, instead of a fear of losing
the general election, the greatest threshold the incumbent
must cross to be re-elected is to secure renomination by her
party. If the incumbent wins the primary, she will be re-
elected in the general election with certainty, whereas if the
incumbent is defeated in the primary, a random draw from
the same party replaces her on the ticket and wins the gen-
eral election. While stark, this is a reasonable approximation
to heavily gerrymandered districts or in conservative states
with possible Tea Party challenges. With this interpretation
of our model, majority opinion reﬂects the majority within
the primary electorate in the incumbent’s party.ANALYSIS
Politician second-period behavior and the
voters’ re-election decision
We now turn to analyzing the behavior in this game. We
look for Perfect Bayesian Equilibria, restricting attention to
equilibria in which all voters always hold the same beliefs
about the politician’s type. Our main focus will be on thebehavior in the ﬁrst period when the politician is electorally
accountable. In order to understand the politician’s incen-
tives in the ﬁrst period, however, we must ﬁrst understand
which voter beliefs will make it more likely that the incum-
bent is re-elected. For this reason, we begin by solving for
politician behavior in period 2. In period 2, the politician is
unaccountable to voters and chooses the effort allocation
that maximizes her policy payoff.
As g 1 1=2, all politicians and all voters care more about
issue A than issue B. Hence, in the second period, the poli-
tician focuses ﬁrst on addressing issue A if any change is de-
sired on that issue (v2 p 1). The politician will then spend
any left over effort on the B dimension, with the type 1 pol-
itician exerting effort to implement pB p 1 and the type 21
politician to implement pB p 21. We then have the follow-
ing lemma.
Lemma 1: Politician Action in the Second Period. In
period t p 2:1. A politician of type 1 chooses wA p minfW, 1g
and wB pW 2 wA when v2 p 1 and wB p
minfW, 1g and wA p 0 when v2 p 0.
2. A politician of type21 chooseswA p minfW, 1g
and wB p 2(W 2 wA) when v2 p 1 and wB p
2minfW, 1g and wA p 0 when v2 p 0.Note that, as v2 p 0 occurs with positive probability, the
second-period behavior of different types differs with positive
probability for all W. The politician’s type is then relevant to
voters: a voter’s payoff is higher from re-electing an incum-
bent who shares that voter’s policy preferences.
We next consider the voters’ decision of whether to re-
elect the incumbent. The expected second-period payoff to
voters of type x B p 1 (x B p 21) is increasing in the prob-
ability the politician is type 1 (type 21), and all voters ben-
eﬁt if the politician is of higher valence. We assume that al
voters vote sincerely, and so will vote for the incumbent if
and only if, given her valence and the beliefs about her type
the expected payoff is higher than from a random challenger
To be re-elected, the incumbent must receive at least half
the votes. So she will be re-elected if and only if the majority
type at the time of the election (which is type 1 with proba-
bility 12 h 1 1=2) supports her re-election. As the type 1
voter’s payoff is strictly increasing in m, the voters’ belief the
incumbent is type 1, so too is the incumbent’s re-election
probability.
Lemma 2: Voter Behavior. The incumbent’s re-
election probability is strictly increasing in m and is
equal to 1/2 when mp mP.
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eﬁts electorally from being perceived as type 1.7We now turn
to analyzing the ﬁrst-period effort choice, ﬁrst with trans-
parent effort and then in the case in which only the outcome
is observable. We consider the actions the incumbent poli-
tician will take in the ﬁrst period in order to signal that she is
type 1.
Equilibrium with observable effort choices
We ﬁrst analyze the case with transparent effort—when
voters observe (wA,wB) as well as (pA, pB). As the incumbent
beneﬁts from convincing the voters that she is type 1, the
ﬁrst period is a signaling game. This means that there can be
many equilibria, especially when re-election concerns are
paramount (f is high), depending on voters’ off-path beliefs.
However, applying criterion D1 from Cho and Kreps (1987)
generates a unique equilibrium prediction, up to the beliefs
at certain off-path information sets. Criterion D1 simply says
that, if the voters see an out of equilibrium effort allocation,
they should believe it was taken by the type of politician who
would have an incentive to choose that allocation for the least
restrictive set of beliefs. A formal deﬁnition is included in
appendix A. As is standard in this literature, we focus on
equilibria satisfying D1 and refer to them simply as an equi-
librium.
We now solve for equilibrium behavior in the ﬁrst pe-
riod, at which point the incumbent chooses effort to inﬂu-
ence the ﬁrst-period policy as well as her probability of being
re-elected. From a policy perspective, the greatest return to
effort is on policy A, but, as we established in lemma 2, her
re-election probability increases in the voters’ belief she is
type 1. The incumbent can signal that she is type 1 by en-
gaging in effort that is comparatively less costly for a type 1
politician than a type21 politician: by diverting effort from
issue A to issue B.
Type 1 politicians receive higher utility from increasing
pB than type 21 politicians, so it is relatively less costly for
a type 1 politician to choosewB 1 0. There is one caveat, how-
ever. As politicians care about the policy implemented after
leaving ofﬁce, a politician has a greater incentive to secure re-
election if her replacement is less likely to be the same type.7. Lemma 2 would still hold if the status quo in the second period is
endogenous to the ﬁrst-period policy. When v2p 0, type 1 politicians are
incentivized to exert effort to increase the policy in the B dimension, and
type 21 to decrease it. Regardless of the status quo, at least one of those
alternatives is feasible, and so majority-type voters receive a higher ex-
pected payoff from majority-type politicians. The subsequent results on
ﬁrst-period behavior would then go through fundamentally unchanged
with different assumptions about the second-period status quo.
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cian receives little beneﬁt from re-election, and so she has less
incentive to posture even though it is comparatively less
costly. However, when f is not too small—greater than some
nonnegative level f^—the beneﬁts from re-election are large
enough that type 21 politicians have a greater incentive to
posture. How much effort will be diverted to issue B depends
on the degree of ofﬁce motivation.
When f is low (but greater than f^) politicians are more
concerned with the policy implemented in the current pe-
riod than with securing re-election, so both types focus the
bulk of their energies on issue A. However, the type 1 pol-
itician can separate herself by placing strictly positive effort
on B. As the type 1 politician has a strictly greater incentive
to increase wB than the type 21 politician, criterion D1
requires that, if wB is greater than the equilibrium level, the
voters infer that the incumbent is type 1 with certainty. This
generates a discrete jump in the re-election probability rela-
tive to when voters are unsure of her type, so in equilib-
rium, the politician’s type must be fully revealed by her effort
choice. In a separating equilibrium, type 21 chooses wA p
minfW, 1g and wB p 2(W 2 wA) and type 1 chooses wB 1
0 and wA pW 2 wB with voters perfectly learning the in-
cumbent’s type.
Now consider the case in which f is high, and so the
primary concern of politicians is to secure re-election. Then,
although type 1 politicians have an incentive to try to sepa-
rate by putting additional effort on issue B, a type 21 poli-
tician is no longer willing to reduce her re-election probabil-
ity by focusing effort on her preferred policy and revealing
herself to be type 21. As the type 21 politician always has
an incentive to mimic type 1, and the type 1 politician al-
ways has an incentive to try to separate by increasing wB,
the only possible equilibrium is pooling with all politicians
choosing wB p minfW, 1g, the maximal effort on issue B.
We refer to this pooling equilibrium as a posturing equi-
librium.
Finally note that, by lemma 2, emphasizing B in a sep-
arating equilibrium results in re-election with a higher prob-
ability than in a pooling equilibrium. For intermediate levels
of ofﬁce-motivation, then, it is not possible to have an equi-
librium that is either separating, as the type 21 politician
would have an incentive to mimic type 1, or pooling, as the
type 21 politician would not be incentivized to posture. For
this range of parameters, the equilibrium is partially-pooling.
In a partial-pooling equilibrium, the type 1 politician’s behav-
ior is the same as in a posturing equilibrium, and the type 21
politician randomizes between her behavior in a separating
and a posturing equilibrium.
The above discussion leads to the following equilibrium
characterization..047.006 on January 30, 2018 01:50:06 AM
and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
8. See proposition A1 in appendix B for additional details and the proof.
It is possible that a separating or partially-pooling equilibrium requires
lower ofﬁcemotivation than f^(W). This can only occur whenW ≈ 2 and g≈
1 and for such parameters, cases 1 and 2 of proposition 1 are vacuous.
Proposition A1 provides details.
9. Fox and Stephenson (2011) identify a similar effect. They prese
odel in which judicial review, by insulating politicians from their po
hoices, can increase electoral induced distortions.
10. An alternative form of nontransparency, observing wA and wB
not pA and pB, would be uninteresting. Conditional on observing the e
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ne-Proposition 1: Characterization of Equilibrium.
There exists f^(W) ≥ 0 such that, when f 1 f^(W),
there is a unique equilibrium up to the beliefs at off-
path information sets. Assume f 1 f^(W). Then there
exist f(j, h,W) and f(j, h,W) such that the unique
equilibrium is
1. separating if f ≤ f(j, h,W ).
2. partially-pooling if f ∈ (f(j, h,W),f(j, h,W )).
3. posturing if f ≥ f(j, h,W ).
Proposition 1 characterizes the equilibrium behavior and
the resulting inefﬁciencies.8 As g 1 1=2, all voters and pol-
iticians agree that issue A is more important and would re-
ceive a greater utility beneﬁt from effort spent on A than B.
So, in the ﬁrst period, if wA ! minfW, 1g, as happens for
many parameter values, a pareto-dominated effort allocation
is chosen.When, as inpart 3, strongofﬁcemotivation leads toa
posturing equilibrium, the effect is particularly pronounced.
Not only is there the largest possible distortion of effort away
from issue A, but this distortion is driven by the incentives
for politicians to signal to voters. However, since both types
posture, voters do not learn anything about the incumbent
politician from this socially wasteful signaling. A posturing
equilibrium is then unambiguously worse than a separating
equilibrium as it generates lower voter welfare in both periods.
Proposition 1 provides an explanation for why politicians
would exert so much effort on divisive issues of marginal im-
portance. Politicians can use these issues as a costly signal
that they are aligned with the majority; a politician who fails
to work on the divisive issue, even if she works instead on
issues that beneﬁt voters more, will be perceived as non-
congruent on the divisive issue. There is greater posturing
by politicians when ofﬁce motivation is stronger. Note, how-
ever, that the only time any politician works toward a policy
opposed to the majority’s preferences is when ofﬁce motiva-
tion is low. So stronger ofﬁce motivation makes the positions
taken on a given issue more aligned with majority opinion
but, at the same time, creates a distortion in terms of excessive
emphasis on more divisive issues.
We now consider how the cutoffs f(j, h,W) and
f(j, h,W) vary with the parameters. As it is only possible to
support a separating equilibrium when f ≤ f(j, h,W) and a
posturing equilibrium when f ≥ f(j, h,W), f(j, h,W) andf(j, h,W) are indices of how likely (in a world of rand
parameter values) it is to have an equilibrium without p
vasive posturing. When h increases (i.e., the next electio
further away), posturing is less likely because voter bel
have less impact on the re-election probability. An analog
effect is caused by an increase in j, the importance of valen
The effect of W, the institutional authority parameter, is
stead nonmonotonic. To state this comparative static, we
ﬁne f0(h,W) ≡ limj→0f(j, h,W) and f

0(h,W) ≡ limj→
(j, h,W) as the limit of the cutoffs as valence heterogen
disappears.
Proposition 2: Comparative Statics.1. f(j, h,W) and f(j, h,W) are both increasing
in h and j.
2. f0(h,W) and f

0(h,W) are strictly increasing in
W whenW! 1 and strictly decreasingwhenW1 1Part 2 of proposition 2 shows that, when valence sho
are small, f(j, h,W) andf(j, h,W) are nonmonotonic in
If W is small, it is difﬁcult to support a separating equi
rium. Since politicians’ effort choices are unlikely to in
ence policy, they have a greater incentive to choose the a
cation most likely to get them re-elected—so all incumbe
focus on B.9 AsW increases, effort choices are more likely
have policy consequences, so the incentive for the politic
to allocate effort to her preferred policy increases. Howe
if W is greater than 1, further increases in W make it m
difﬁcult to support a separating equilibrium. This is becau
whenW is large, politicians are capable of getting both pA
1 and pB p 1 with high probability. As the greatest cost of
fort on B is if it comes at the expense of effort that could
spent on A, the costs of posturing are lower whenW is la
WhenW p 1, thepolicy consequences are starkest, andso
equilibrium is separating for the widest range of paramete
First-period behavior with unobservable
effort choices
We now consider the incentives when effort is not tra
parent. That is, we assume the voters can observe only
outcomes (pA and pB) but not the effort allocations (wA
wB).10 As this setting falls outside the scope of standard reﬁnt a
licy
butm
cffort
1276 / Elections and Divisiveness Elliott Ash, Massimo Morelli, and Richard Van Weeldenments, such as criterion D1, we do not apply such reﬁnements
to select among equilibria here. Instead, we focus on the case
in which f is large, so the dominant concern is to secure re-
election. Then, if the politician’s effort allocation were trans-
parent, the result would be a posturing equilibrium in which
both types focus effort on issue B. We focus on the class of
Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in which the type 1 politician’s
action is the same as in the transparency model.
The effect of transparency depends critically onW. When
the effort allocation is transparent, if the voters observe any
effort allocation other than that chosen by type 1, they know
with certainty that the politician deviated and so is type21.
With nontransparency, a deviation (may) not be observed
with certainty. Consequently, parameter values that admit a
posturing equilibrium with transparent effort will not nec-
essarily generate the same behavior when effort choices are
nontransparent. When W ! 1 we have the following result:
Proposition 3: Transparency Can Increase Effort
and First-Period Welfare. There cannot exist a pos-
turing equilibriumwhenW ! 1.Whenf is sufﬁciently
large, there exists a unique pure strategy equilibrium
in which the type 1 politician chooses wB pW. In this
equilibrium, the type 21 politician chooses wA p 0
and wB ∈ (0,W).
When effort is nontransparent and W ! 1, there cannot
be a posturing equilibrium. If both types choose the same
effort allocation, then, regardless of the realized outcome
pB ∈ f0, 1g, voters would not update about the politician.
Because the type21 politician strictly prefers pB p 0 to pB p
1 from a policy perspective, but the re-election probability
would be the same, as she would have an incentive to deviate
and choose wA p wB p 0 rather than wB pW. So we can
rule out a posturing equilibrium. Further, the type 21 poli-
tician cannot choose wA 1 0 or wB ! 0 in equilibrium. This
is because, if the type 1 politician chooses wB pW, pA p 1
and pB p 21 never occur if the politician is type 1, and so
would reveal the politician as type 21 with certainty. As the
politician would not be willing to reveal this when re-election
concerns are paramount, the equilibrium must involve the
type 21 politician choosing wA p 0 and wB ∈ (0,W); wB is
uniquely determined so that the re-election probabilities af-
ter pB p 0 and pB p 1 make a type 21 politician indiffer-
ent between those outcomes.
Proposition 3 characterizes the unique pure-strategy equi-
librium in which type 1 politicians focus on B when W ! 1allocation, the policy outcomes are purely random, and so voters would
not update based on them.
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All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and the re-election motive is strong. In essence, the type 21
politician cannot work toward a different goal than the type 1
politician without revealing her type; however, because she
is personally opposed to the policy change, she does not work
as hard. The lack of transparency then creates further wel-
fare losses in the ﬁrst period. Not only will no politician exert
effort on A but type 21 politicians exert less than full effort
pursuing pB p 1, the majority-preferred policy on the divi-
sive issue.
As such, transparency over the effort allocation is bene-
ﬁcial for ﬁrst-period welfare when W ! 1. However, this
transparency impedes the selection of type 1 politicians since
we have a pooling equilibriumwhen effort is transparent, but,
when effort is nontransparent, the voters update based on the
policy outcome, pB. That transparency can involve trade-offs
between the incentives in the current period and selection
for the future is well known, but the typical trade-off is that
transparency can be bad for incentives but good for sorting.
Here we ﬁnd the opposite.
While transparency has ambiguous effects on welfare
whenW is low, a sharper andunambiguous result holdswhen
W 1 1. To support a posturing equilibrium with transpar-
ency, we need only check that the politician does not have an
incentive to deviate to her most preferred effort allocation
and reveal herself to be type21 with certainty. Hence, we can
support a posturing equilibrium if and only if the policy gain
from this deviation is not enough to justify the correspond-
ing decrease in her re-election probability. When the effort
allocation is nontransparent, the type 21 politician still has
this deviation available, but she has other potential devia-
tions as well. In particular, she could deviate to choose wA p
1 and wB pW 2 1, and voters will only realize she deviated
if pB ≠ 1. Greater ofﬁce motivation is necessary to prevent
this deviation than a deviation to her most preferred effort al-
location. As the type 21 politician reduces her effort on B
fromwB p 1, she will initially transfer this effort on hermain
policy goal: securing pA p 1. Once she has ensured this with
certainty, however, by setting wA p 1, further decreases in
wB give less policy beneﬁt but the same re-election cost. So it
is more difﬁcult to support a posturing equilibriumwith non-
transparency. We get the following proposition.
Proposition 4: Transparency Can Increase Postur-
ing. When W 1 1 and effort is nontransparent:.047.00
and Co1. The minimum ofﬁce motivation necessary for a
posturing equilibrium to exist is strictly higher
than f(j, h,W).
2. There exists an open interval of f greater than
f(j, h,W) such that an equilibrium exists in6 on January 30, 2018 01:50:06 AM
nditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
11.
terms
reason
“confo
that go
12.
this ou
on the
Volume 79 Number 4 October 2017 / 1277which the type 1 politician chooses wB p 1,
wA pW 2 1 and type 21 randomizes between
wAp 1,wBpW 2 1 and wBp 1,wApW 2 1.When f is sufﬁciently large, the beneﬁts from holding
ofﬁce are great enough that no politician would want to risk
pB p 0 and likely electoral defeat. Hence, regardless of the
transparency regime, politicians pool with maximal effort on
issue B, and voters cannot update about them. In contrast, for
intermediate ofﬁce motivation, the welfare implications of
nontransparency are unambiguous for the majority in both
periods. Type 21 politicians place more effort on A, which
gives a higher payoff to everyone in the ﬁrst period. Further,
because pA p 1 is more likely and pB p 1 is less likely, when
the politician is type 21, voters learn about the politician’s
type. Hence, nontransparency over actions is beneﬁcial in this
range, both in terms of the ﬁrst- period action and in terms
of selecting a politician aligned with the majority in the fu-
ture.11 As nontransparency decreases the reputational beneﬁt
from posturing, this breaks the posturing equilibrium, lead-
ing to more efﬁcient politician effort choices and more voter
learning.
So we have shown that, when W 1 1, making effort allo-
cations transparent can increase posturing by elected ofﬁcials
and decrease the amount voters can learn from this behavior.
For example, it is likely that the advent of cable news caused
politicians to focus more time on trivialities and polarizing
debates; similarly, we may worry that if cabinet meetings
were televised, or the minutes were publicly released, concern
about signaling popular preferences would distract members
from working to advance the most important goals.12 While
our model considers only one dimension of policy making,
and only one of many ways transparency can affect the policy-
making process, our results speak to this concern, while also
demonstrating that voters may actually learn less when these
debates are more transparent.
EXTENSION: POSTURING AND POLARIZATION
So far we have considered only the decision of a single in-
cumbent and have found that both types posture by focus-
ing effort on the majority position on the divisive issue. Of
course, different politicians are accountable to different con-Prat (2005) also ﬁnds that transparency can be harmful both in
of the ﬁrst-period action and selection but for a very different
. Prat ﬁnds that increased transparency can increase the risk of
rmism” whereby the politician would be unwilling to take an action
es against the voters’ prior.
Kaiser’s (2013) account of the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act bears
t. He argues that televising the debate made it very difﬁcult to focus
important parts of banking regulation.
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tive districts and Democrats elected in liberal ones. As the
majority position on divisive issues varies across districts,
politicians in different districts have an incentive to signal that
they are on different sides of the divisive issue. We consider
this possibility now. While elections across multiple districts
can interact in subtle and interestingways, analyzed elsewhere
(e.g., Krasa and Polborn 2015; Mattozzi and Snowberg 2015),
we abstract from these interactions to keep the analysis as
simple as possible.
We interpret type xj p 21 as the Democrat position and
xj p 1 as the Republican position. There are Republican dis-
tricts and Democrat districts, and in Republican (Demo-
cratic) districts, the fraction of voters of type xj p 1 is m1 ∈
(1=2, 1) (m1 ∈ (0, 1=2)). InRepublican (Democratic) districts,
the incumbent is drawn from the pool of Republican (Dem-
ocratic) politicians, the fraction of whom are type 1 is mP ∈
(1=2, 1) (mP ∈ (0, 1=2)). We assume that if the incumbent is
replaced, it is by a member of the same party, so we interpret
the election as a primary election, as described at the end of
the second section of the article. The assumption that mP is
nondegenerate reﬂects that, although a Republican is more
likely to hold the Republican policy position on a given issue
than a Democrat, party labels are not perfectly informative.
All citizens in all districts agree on the common-values
issue, and themajority position in a district is reversed before
the next election with probability h ∈ ½0, 1=2). The following
result is immediate from proposition 1 and proposition 2.13
Proposition 5: Posturing with Heterogeneous Dis-
tricts. Under transparency, when f ≥ f(j, h,W), an
incumbent of either type in a Republican district chooses
wB p minfW, 1g and wA pW 2 wB, and an incum-
bent of either type in aDemocrat district chooseswB p
2minfW, 1g and wA pW 1 wB, in the ﬁrst period.
Furthermore, f(j, h,W) is decreasing in h.
Proposition 5 then predicts that when incumbents rep-
resent different constituencies, with different views on the
divisive issue, Republicans andDemocrats will focus on push-
ing the policies on contentious issues in opposite directions.
While many concerns have been expressed about the polari-
zation of American politics (e.g., Fiorina et al. 2006;McCarty,
Poole, and Rosenthal 2006), our results suggest that one13. For simplicity, we state proposition 5 with transparent effort. When
effort is nontransparent, a similar result obtains, but the statement of in-
cumbent behavior is more complicated whenW ! 1. A similar result would
hold if incumbents face a challenger from the opposite party, but proposi-
tion 5 would not follow directly from earlier results.
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1278 / Elections and Divisiveness Elliott Ash, Massimo Morelli, and Richard Van Weeldenconcern may be that it distracts politicians from common-
values issues. If different politicians are posturing to different
constituencies, Republicans and Democrats will focus their
attention on pursuing diametrically opposed goals on the is-
sues on which voters disagree, ignoring important common-
values issues in the process. It is the focus on diametrically
opposed goals for Republicans and Democrats that we test
empirically in the next section.
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF POLITICAL POSTURING
This section reports an empirical investigation of political
posturing motivated by the theoretical results described in
the previous sections. Our approach is to construct a mea-
sure of political posturing among US Congress members by
analyzing the divisiveness of their ﬂoor speeches.
Applying the model to Congress, we view each legislator
as deciding to divide speaking time (W ) between common-
values issues (wA) and divisive issues (wB). Congressional
ﬂoor speech can be understood as effort to introduce legis-
lation or inﬂuence the outcome of a vote, and such effort may
or may not be successful. Our outcome variable for the em-
pirical analysis is wB/W, the fraction of divisive speech.14
We explore two questions derived from our theoretical
framework.First, do stronger electoral concerns inducegreater
political posturing by incumbents? Second, do incumbents
engage in more posturing when their actions are more trans-
parent?
On the ﬁrst question, our theory provides a clear testable
hypothesis: we expect greater posturing when electoral con-
cerns are stronger. Proposition 5 suggests that in response to
a more imminent election (i.e., h is lower), legislators in Re-
publican stateswill focus onpushing thepolicy on the divisive
issue in one direction, and legislators in Democratic states
will focus on pushing it in the other direction. Our empiri-
cal approach is to use the staggered election cycle in the
US Senate as exogenous variation and measure the within-
senator change in divisiveness as the next election becomes
more imminent.
On the second question, proposition 4 suggests that in-
creased transparency will be associated with more divisive
speech—although this prediction does depend on parameter
values (moderately high ofﬁce motivation and high W ). In
the empirical analysis, we examine the effect of transpar-
ency in the House of Representatives, exploiting variation in
the overlap between congressional districts and local media14. While our theoretical analysis focuses on the incentives to focus
on divisive issues that are relatively unimportant, all else equal, an in-
creased focus on low-importance divisive issues would also increase total
divisive speech.
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whether House members engage in more divisive speech
when the media coverage is stronger. If transparency is as-
sociated with greater divisiveness, that would be consistent
with our posturing model when ofﬁce motivation andW are
high.
Measuring divisiveness
Ourmeasure of political effort allocation is constructed from
the material in the Congressional Record attributed to each
legislator for the years 1973–2012. We designed the speech
segmenting algorithm to include only ﬂoor speech (rather
than other written materials read into the Record, for ex-
ample, bill text and the material in the “Extensions of Re-
marks”). We do this because we want our measure to reﬂect
effort exerted by the member. We also drop the speaker of
the house, the presiding ofﬁcer in the Senate, and nonvoting
members.15
Given that the theoretical model concerns policy actions
(rather than speech), the link between the theory and em-
pirics depends on the assumption that ﬂoor speech matters
for policy. This is a matter of debate, with some scholars (e.g.,
Cohen 1999; Jacobs and Shapiro 2000) arguing that rhetoric
is often unrelated to policy, and others (e.g., Maltzman and
Siegelman 1996; Quinn et al. 2010) arguing that it correlates
well with policy making. Compared to other venues for po-
litical speech (e.g., press releases, campaign events), the con-
gressional ﬂoor is likely where speech and policy are most
closely related. To the extent that legislators are defending
their own votes and persuading their colleagues to vote with
them, ﬂoor speech measures the effort allocated across differ-
ent votes and issues. Moreover, legislators use ﬂoor speeches
to introduce legislation, as well as to explain and justify bills
they introduced or co-sponsored. So, if speech tracks policy
priorities (at least somewhat), then the divisiveness of speech
proxies for the relative effort exerted across issues of differ-
ent divisiveness.
The methods for constructing the speech data are de-
scribed in detail in online appendix C. After selecting 3,000
high-information phrases, we score each phrase k by session
t on a metric Divisivenesskt based on Gentzkow and Shapiro
(2010) and Jensen et al. (2012). This metric scores language
as divisive if it is used more often by just one of the political
parties, meaning that this language can serve as a signal of15. The Record does not include the speech from committee hearings,
so committee assignment should not be a signiﬁcant source of omitted var-
iable bias. Any effects on speech due to party inﬂuence should be uncorrelated
with our treatment variables (the election schedule and the transparency
measure).
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Volume 79 Number 4 October 2017 / 1279partisan policy emphasis. This method can be contrasted
with the more traditional approach in political science that
uses manual content analysis by human coders to measure
policy (e.g., Lowe et al. 2011). While there are trade-offs, our
approach has the advantage of not requiring a number of
subjective decisions about how different policies are coded.This content downloaded from 035.176
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms To demonstrate the usefulness of the method, we report
in table 2 the most and least divisive phrases, where scores
are averaged across sessions using the pooled data set. The
divisive phrases are divided between those associated with
Republicans and those associated with Democrats. The se-
lected phrases follow our intuitions about the conserva-Table 2. Most and Least Divisive Phrases, 1973–2012Divisive Phrases Associated with Republicansadult stem cell health saving account.047.006 on January 30, 2018 0
and Conditions (http://www.joupersonal income tax
balanced budget constitution income tax rate right bear arm
billion barrel oil Iraq study group small business owner
capital gain tax largest tax increase special interest group
center medicare medicaid marginal tax rate stand adjournment previous
embryonic stem cell marriage tax penalty stood trillion hundred
federal debt stood medical saving account tax increase history
federation independent business national drug control trade promotion authority
free enterprise system national federation independent trillion cubic foot
global war terror oil natural gas wage price control
gross national product partial birth abortion windfall proﬁt taxDivisive Phrases Associated with Democratsallocation current level cut social security prescription drug cost
billion trade deﬁcit distinguished republican leader prescription drug plan
Boehlert Boehner Bonilla education health care resolve committee union
child health insurance give tax break tax break wealthy
civil right movement Johnson Sam Jones tax cut wealthiest
civil service discharged late term abortion tax cut wealthy
committee interior insular managed care plan test ban treaty
comprehensive test ban Martin Luther King trade deﬁcit billion
conduct hearing entitled minimum wage worker veteran health care
cost prescription drug nuclear arm race victim domestic violence
credit card company oversight government reform woman right chooseLeast Divisive Phrasesbanking ﬁnance urban forward continuing work merchant marine ﬁshery
chemical weapon convention great deal money passed signed law
civil service commission hard work dedication played important role
committee held hearing homeland security appropriation played key role
committee worked hard important step forward protect national security
dedicated public servant improve health care public private partnership
defense appropriation subcommittee international ﬁnancial institution public private sector
democracy human right law enforcement assistance renewable energy source
federal highway administration law enforcement community research development administration
ﬁnance urban affair made great stride theater missile defense
ﬁscal budget request major step forward worked long hardNote. List of 33 most divisive Republican trigrams, most divisive Democrat trigrams, and least divisive trigrams, as scored by Pearson’s chi-squared metric
(Gentzkow and Shapiro 2010), using the average score pooled across the years in the sample. This ranking uses speech from both the Senate and the House.1:50:06 AM
rnals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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related phrases: for Republicans, we see “embryonic stem
cell” and “partial birth abortion”; for Democrats, we see “late
term abortion” and “woman’s right (to) choose.” We see a
similar intuitive trend for taxes: the Republican list includes
“capital gains tax,” “largest tax increase,” and “marriage tax
penalty”; the Democrat list includes “give tax break,” “tax
breaks (for the) wealthy,” and “tax cuts (for the) wealthiest.”
In the list of least divisive language, meanwhile, we see in-
nocuous phases and references to common-values policies,
such as “federal highway administration,” “homeland security
appropriation,” and “law enforcement community.” These
intuitive phrase rankings are encouraging for the use of this
metric as a measure of divisiveness. The full list of phrases is
available from the authors upon request.16
We then construct the speech divisiveness for legislator
j during session t as the log of the frequency-weighted di-
visiveness of the phrases used by the legislator during ses-
sion t. That measure is given by:
Yjt p log
1
Njt
o
k
Frequencyjkt ⋅ Divisivenesskt
 
: ð1Þ
Frequencyjkt is the normalized frequency of phrase k for leg-
islator j during session t, and Njt is the total number of
phrases used by j at t (from the set of 3,000 selected for the
analysis).17 We use the log of the measure, so results can be
interpreted as proportional changes in divisiveness due to the
treatments. Using levels rather than logs does not change the
sign of the estimates, though the degree of statistical signiﬁ-
cance changes under some speciﬁcations.
Table 3 reports summary statistics on congressional
speech. Because there are fewer of them, senators speak a lot
more than house members. The small minimum frequency
numbers are due to the relatively small included vocabulary
of 3,000 phrases; this may be concerning, but our results are
not affected by dropping the observations with the lowest
frequencies. The speech divisiveness rows give the measures
constructed for Senate speech andHouse speech, respectively.16. Of course, some phrases classiﬁed as divisive will not be divisive
but will be classiﬁed that way because, simply by chance, one party hap-
pened to say those phrases more often. See Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Taddy
(2016) for a discussion of this issue. Note that the effect of this is to make the
divisive speech measure more noisy, and so it will bias the estimates of the
treatments on divisive speech toward 0 and against ﬁnding an effect.
17. The divisiveness index can be computed from the language of ei-
ther the Senate or the House. In the empirical analysis, we use a legislator’s
own chamber as the text source for computing divisiveness, even though a
member’s own speech inﬂuences the divisiveness measure for her own
chamber. The results are nearly identical, however, when using the divi-
siveness metric computed from speech in the other chamber, which cannot
be affected by the member’s own speech.
This content downloaded from 035.176
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms The negative numbers reﬂect that the measures are in logs—
a divisiveness measure smaller in absolute value means higher
divisiveness. Perhaps expectedly, House members have a
higher average divisiveness than Ssenators. Theminimumand
maximum columns show some outliers—dropping these out-
liers does not affect the results.
Effect of electoral incentives on posturing
Our sample of politicians for the election analysis is the set
of 331 senators working for the years 1973–2012 (Congres-
sional Sessions 93–112). To identify the effect of stronger
electoral incentives, we exploit the staggering of elections.
Senators face re-election every six years, with one-third of the
senators up for re-election in any given election cycle. This
gives variation in the time to re-election, with stronger elec-
toral pressures when the next election is more imminent.
Previous papers demonstrating that the staggered election
cycle can affect senator behavior include Conconi, Facchini,
and Zanardi (2014), Elling (1982), Kuklinski (1978), Quinn
et al. (2010), and Thomas (1985).
Building on the approach in these papers, we use ﬁxed
effects for each Senator j and see how the behavior of a sen-
ator varies according to her electoral cohort. If cohort status
is as good as randomly assigned (conditional on the ﬁxed
effects), we obtain consistent estimates of the effect of time
to election on the outcome variables of interest. In our re-
gression, we represent the election treatment by the variable
Ejt for electoral cohort, which equals one for the ﬁrst cohort,
two for the second cohort, and three for the third cohort
(i.e., currently up for election). This speciﬁcation provides
a simple linear model of the strength of electoral incentives
and is motivated by the upward trend in divisiveness over
the election cycle illustrated in ﬁgure 1.
In our Senate elections regressions, we model divisiveness
Yjt (deﬁned in eq. [1]) for Senator j during session t as
Yjt p ajt 1 rEEjt 1 X
0
jtb1 εjt , ð2Þ
where ajt includes a set of ﬁxed effects and Xjt includes con-
trols for years of experience. These terms are discussed in
greater detail along with the reported estimates.
Since the outcome variable Yjt is a log measure, the esti-
mate r^E can be interpreted as the average percent increase in
senator speech divisiveness from moving into the next elec-
tion cohort (closer to the next scheduled election). If r^E p 0,
then electoral incentives do not affect the tendency to use
divisive phrases. If r^E ! 0, then electoral incentives mitigate
divisive rhetoric. If r^E 1 0, then electoral incentives increase
the tendency of senators to use divisive language.
The error term εjt includes omitted variables and ran-
domness. Our identifying assumption is that, conditional.047.006 on January 30, 2018 01:50:06 AM
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election schedule for the Senate. In our regressions we cluster
the error term by state, allowing for arbitrary serial correlation
across a state’s senators and over time. The results for esti-
mating equation (2), the effect of election cohort on divisive-
ness, are reported in table 4. We discuss each column in turn.
Column 1 includes party-year ﬁxed effects. This speciﬁ-
cation allows for arbitrary variation over time in the outcome
variable for both Democrats and Republicans, but it im-This content downloaded from 035.176
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms plicitly compares divisiveness across senators within years.
In this speciﬁcation, the effect of elections on divisiveness is
positive and statistically signiﬁcant.
Column 2 includes state-year ﬁxed effects. This speciﬁ-
cation allows for arbitrary variation in the outcome variable
over time in each state. This estimate is identiﬁed only from
differences in divisiveness between the two senators from the
same state, based onwhich one is closer to re-election. Again,
the estimate for r^E is positive and signiﬁcant.
Column 3 adds senator ﬁxed effects rather than state-year
ﬁxed effects. This speciﬁcation allows for variation over time
in the whole Senate’s divisiveness, as well as senator-level dif-
ferences in divisiveness. Again, the estimated effect is signif-
icantly positive. The estimate coefﬁcients do not changemuch
across these ﬁxed-effects speciﬁcations, supporting the as-
sumption of exogenous assignment to election cohort.
Finally, column 4 adds Xjt, a cubic polynomial in years of
experience. This covariate should control for life-cycle trends
in divisiveness that may be mechanically correlated with the
election cohort. The estimate for r^E remains positive and
statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level (pp .001); we can reject
the null hypothesis that rEp 0 in favor of the alternative that
rE 1 0. A coefﬁcient of 0.0556 implies that speech divisive-
ness increases by 5.56% on average (about one-sixteenth of a
standard deviation) as a senator moves to a cohort nearer to
the next election.18Table 3. Speech StatisticsSummary StatisticsMean SD18. We ran a
previous election,
in the state as a m
own election did
election years (les
visiveness, but th
.047.006 on Janu
and Conditions (hMinimumseparate speciﬁcation
and separately, the c
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not have an impact on
s than 5% win), there
e increase is not statis
ary 30, 2018 01:50:06
ttp://www.journals.ucMaximumSenators:
Phrases used 985.922 440.47 1 2,306
Summed frequency 3,902.801 3,306.333 1 26,435
Speech divisiveness 212.0835 .777 217.527 29.844House members:
Phrases used 336.73 225.99 1 1,475
Summed frequency 840.68 960.99 2 11,974
Speech divisiveness 210.509 .657 214.699 28.536Note. Observation is a congressman-session. Phrases used refers to the number of phrases (out of the 3,000-
phrase vocabulary) used in a session. Summed frequency refers to the total number of times a phrase in the
vocabulary is used in a session. Speech divisiveness refers to the (log) measure of divisiveness constructed
from speech, as described in online appendix C.Table 4. Election Effects on Senator Speech Divisiveness(1) (2) (3) (4)Election cohort .0906** .0715** .0658** .0556**
(.0148) (.0228) (.0156) (.0158)
[.001] [.003] [.001] [.001]Adjusted R2 .182 .121 .459 .464
Party-year ﬁxed
effects X X X XState-year ﬁxed
effects XSenator ﬁxed effects X X
Experience controls Xs using the closeness of the senator’s
loseness of the presidential election
seness. The closeness of a senator’s
the estimates. In close presidential
is a stronger electoral effect on di-
tically signiﬁcant (pp .164).Note. The sample includes 331 senators, 20 sessions, and 1,985 senator-
sessions. Election cohort equals 1, 2, or 3 depending on senator cohort
status. Party-year ﬁxed effects include party-year interaction ﬁxed effects.
State-year ﬁxed effects include state-year interaction ﬁxed effects. Senator
ﬁxed effects include ﬁxed effects for each senator. Experience controls in-
clude a cubic in years of experience. Standard errors (clustered by state) are
in parentheses; p-values are in brackets.
1 p ! .10.
* p ! .05.
** p ! .01. AM
hicago.edu/t-and-c).
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age speech divisiveness for senators in the ﬁrst 12 years (the
ﬁrst six sessions) of their career, residualized with senator
ﬁxed effects. For both the ﬁrst and second terms of ofﬁce,
there is a clear increase in divisiveness as the next election
becomes more imminent. Moreover, there is a drop in di-
visiveness from the third to the fourth session, reﬂecting that
divisiveness decreases after securing re-election. The same
trend holds for later years in the senators’ careers as well.
Along with the regression estimates, this graphical evidence
supports the theory of electorally induced posturing: greater
electoral pressures induce a greater focus on divisive issues.
This result adds to the previous literature ﬁnding that
roll call votes tend to be more moderate for election-cohort
senators (e.g., Thomas 1985). As previously discussed, our
model shows that elections can induce both more moderate
voting (i.e., politicians more likely to support the majority
position) on each given issue but at the same time generate
a greater emphasis on divisive issues. Our approach allows us
to capture these additional nuances in how electoral pres-
sures inﬂuence politician behavior.Effect of transparency on posturing
Our sample of politicians for the transparency analysis is
the population of US House members working for the years
1991–2002 (Congressional Sessions 102–107). To identifyThis content downloaded from 035.176
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms changes in transparency we use the measure of newspaper
coverage constructedby Snyder andStromberg (2010),which
exploits the arbitrary overlap between congressional districts
and newspaper distribution markets. In particular, our em-
pirical deﬁnition of transparency is the natural log of Snyder
andStromberg’s (2010) “congruence”measure, deﬁned as the
weighted average overlap between newspaper markets and
congressional districts:
Tjt p log o
m
MarketSharejtm ⋅ ReaderSharejtm
 
, ð3Þ
where MarketSharejtm is the share of the local news market
ﬁlled by newspaperm and ReaderSharejtm is the share of news-
paper m’s readers living in district j. Snyder and Stromberg
demonstrate that higher newspaper coverage due to higher
market-district overlap is associated with more articles and
higher voter knowledge about their representative, as well as
higher legislator effort on somemeasures. We use logs so that
the coefﬁcients may be interpreted as elasticities, but using
the level of the measure generates similar results.
For the House of Representatives, we model speech divi-
siveness Yjt (deﬁned in eq. [1]) as
Yjt p ajt 1 rTTjt 1 Xjt
0b1 εjt , ð4Þ
where ajt , Xjt, and εjt, respectively, represent ﬁxed effects,
controls, and the error term (as in the previous subsection).
The identifying assumption is that, conditional on inclusion
of ﬁxed effects and controls, εjt is uncorrelated with the trans-
parency measure. Standard errors are clustered by congres-
sional district, allowing for arbitrary serial correlation within
district over time.
Since both Tjt and Yjt are in logs, the estimate r^T can be
interpreted as the average percent change in divisiveness due
to a 1% increase in transparency. If r^T p 0, then transpar-
ency is unrelated to divisiveness. If r^T ! 0, then transparency
reduces divisive rhetoric. If r^T 1 0, then transparency in-
creases the tendency of House members to use divisive lan-
guage. The results from regressing the use of divisive phrases
on the House transparency measure are reported in table 5.
We discuss each column in turn.
Column 1 includes just party-year ﬁxed effects. As with
the Senate analysis, this speciﬁcation allows for variation in
divisive speech over time for both parties. On this speciﬁ-
cation, the effect of transparency on divisiveness is positive
but not statistically signiﬁcant (pp .12).
Column 2 adds controls for district ideology. We include
this control because other papers, such as Grimmer (2013),
ﬁnd evidence that representatives emphasize appropriations
rather than political positions when they are in competitive
districts. Speciﬁcally, we use a cubic in the lagged presidentialFigure 1. Senator speech divisiveness by election cohort. This ﬁgure plots
average senator speech divisiveness over the course of the ﬁrst two terms
(six sessions, 12 years) of a senator’s career. The values plotted are the
mean residuals from a regression of senator speech divisiveness on a
senator ﬁxed effect, grouped by the ﬁrst six sessions. This includes only
senators who began their career in the ﬁrst cohort (excluding senators
appointed or elected to ﬁnish out an existing term). Error spikes indicate
standard errors..047.006 on January 30, 2018 01:50:06 AM
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does not change the transparency effect.19
Column 3 adds state-year ﬁxed effects. This speciﬁcation
is not comparable to the Senate regressions, where the effect
is identiﬁed off differences between the two senators work-
ing in the same state. Here, the state-year ﬁxed effect controls
for any time-varying state-level factors that may be corre-
lated with transparency and divisiveness, for example re-
gional media trends and the actions of state-wide politicians.
The estimates are similar to those of columns 1 and 2, but
stronger, making them statistically signiﬁcant at the 10%
level (pp .076).
Next, column 4 includes member ﬁxed effects. This spec-
iﬁcation identiﬁes the within-member changes in the trans-
parency measure due to changes in newspaper market share.
The coefﬁcient is positive, more than double themagnitude of
the across-legislator coefﬁcients, and statistically signiﬁcant
at the 5% level. Column 5 adds controls for experience, as
done in the Senate analysis. These controls do not change the
effect very much, with similar estimates to column 4.19. We also ran a speciﬁcation controlling for the closeness of the
representative’s previous election (less than 5% win). The point estimate is
that those elected in close races use more divisive speech, but the differ-
ence is not statistically signiﬁcant. There is no difference in the effect of
transparency in close elections.
This content downloaded from 035.176
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms Finally, column 6 runs the same speciﬁcation as column 4
but limiting to the years 1993–2000. Since no redistricting oc-
curs in this period, changes in the transparency measure are
due to changes in local newspaper market.20 We do this to
make sure that the effects are not driven only by redistricting,
which could cause many changes beyond the level of trans-
parency. The estimated effect is similar, and barely statistically
signiﬁcant at the 5% level (pp .050).
Some graphical evidence of this relationship can be seen in
ﬁgure 2. The vertical axis in this ﬁgure is the average speech
divisiveness, residualized on the ﬁxed effects, and grouped in
bins by residualized transparency. The binned means and the
ﬁtted line illustrate that increases in transparency across years
are associated with increases in the within-member speech
divisiveness.
Together, these estimates lend support for the hypoth-
esis that rT1 0. A column 4 coefﬁcient of 0.06 implies that for
a 1% increase in transparency, speech divisiveness increases
by .06% on average (about one-tenth of a standard devia-
tion). Overall, these results are consistent with the modelTable 5. Effect of Transparency on House Speech DivisivenessEffect on Speech Divisiveness(1) (2)w
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[.122] [.170] [.076] [.025] [.049] [.050]Adjusted R2 .096 .104 .108 .419 .439 .457
Party-year ﬁxed effects X X X X X X
District vote controls X X X X X
State-year ﬁxed effects X X
Member ﬁxed effects X X X
Experience controls X
Only 1993–2000 XNote. The sample includes 649 House members, 6 sessions, and 2,009 member-sessions. Transparency refers to the transparency
measure constructed by Snyder and Stromberg (2010), as described in the text. Party-year ﬁxed effects include party-year interaction
ﬁxed effects. District vote controls include lagged cubic in presidential vote shares. State-year ﬁxed effects include state-year in-
teraction ﬁxed effects. Member ﬁxed effects include ﬁxed effects for each congress member. Experience controls include a full range
of party-speciﬁc years-of-experience dummies. Standard errors (clustered by state) are in parentheses; p-values are in brackets.
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more divisiveness.
It is interesting to contrast these transparency results with
Snyder and Stromberg’s (2010) ﬁnding that higher transpar-
ency is associated with greater discretionary federal funds to
the district and more moderate voting records. Our results
suggest that, while improved transparency can have many
beneﬁts, including increased legislator effort, these beneﬁts
must be balanced against the potential downside of increased
political posturing.
CONCLUSIONS
We have considered the incentives of politicians to “posture”
by focusing their efforts on issues that present the greatest
opportunity to signal their preferences to voters, even if they
are not the most important issues facing the country. We
have shown that this incentive can lead politicians to spend
their time pursuing policies that are not only harmful to the
minority but also an inefﬁcient use of time from the ma-
jority’s perspective. In addition, we have shown that greater
transparency about how politicians allocate their time may
increase socially inefﬁcient posturing, while at the same time
impeding the selection of congruent politicians. Finally, we
have produced empirical evidence from the US Congress
that incumbent politicians engage in more divisive speech
when electoral pressures are stronger or when their actions
are more likely to be observed.
While we have focused on only one component of the
policy-making process, our analysis raises important issues
for the design of political institutions. Given that our resultsThis content downloaded from 035.176
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms emphasize the difﬁculty of incentivizing electorally account-
able politicians to focus attention on common-values issues,
our ﬁndings highlight the potential advantage of delegating
common-values tasks to individuals who are politically in-
sulated or whose authority is task-speciﬁc. This can be ac-
complished, perhaps, by delegating to citymanagers who are,
at least somewhat, politically insulated and who have clearly
deﬁned tasks (e.g., Vlaicu and Whalley 2016) or by leaving
such issues in the hands of a competent bureaucracy. The
design of such institutions, as well as a full analysis of the
trade-offs, is an important avenue for future research.
From an empirical perspective, our work raises a number
of interesting questions. Motivated by our theory, it would be
interesting to see which issues incumbents talk about closer
to elections and whether the increased focus on divisive is-
sues is concentrated on issues that are relatively less im-
portant. Such an analysis could be completed by classifying
the speech according to different issue topics and using pub-
lic opinion data to rank the issues by importance. Addition-
ally, it would be interesting to understand the extent to which
changes in speech patterns reﬂect that different policies are
being pursued. In future research, we hope to explore the im-
plications of our empirical ﬁndings for policy and economic
outcomes.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We would like to thank Yisehak Abraham, Tim Chan, Lo-
renzo Lagos, Matthew Salant, and Mariela Sirkis for helpful
research assistance. We would like to thank Ricardo Alonso,
Pierre Boyer, Odilon Camara, Micael Castanheira, Paola
Conconi, Olle Folke, Anothony Fowler, Justin Fox, Shigeo
Hirano, Sean Gailmard, Francesco Giovannoni, Navin Kar-
tik, Ethan Kaplan, Brian Knight, Patrick Legros, Patrick Li-
Bihan, John Matsusaka, Nolan McCarty, Pablo Montagnes,
Suresh Naidu, Andrea Prat, Wolfgang Pesendorfer, Jean-
Laurent Rosenthal, Ken Shotts, Matthew Stephenson, Fran-
cesco Squintani, Balazs Szentes, Erik Snowberg, Mike Ting,
StephaneWolton, two anonymous referees, and various sem-
inar audiences for helpful comments.
REFERENCES
Acemoglu, Daron, Georgy Egorov, and Konstantin Sonin. 2013. “A Polit-
ical Theory of Populism.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 128 (2): 771–
805.
Aragones, Enriqueta, Micael Castaneira, and Marco Giani. 2015. “Electoral
Competition through Issue Selection.” American Journal of Political
Science 59 (1): 71–90.
Ashworth, Scott. 2012. “Electoral Accountability: Recent Theoretical and
Empirical Work.” Annual Review of Political Science 15:183–201.
Canes-Wrone, Brandice, Michael Herron, and Kenneth Shotts. 2001. “Lead-
ership and Pandering: A Theory of Executive Policymaking.” American
Journal of Political Science 45 (3): 532–50.Figure 2. House member speech divisiveness by transparency level. This
ﬁgure plots House member speech divisiveness against the transparency
metric, after residualizing both on a party-year ﬁxed effect, member ﬁxed
effect, and vote margin controls. Observations are grouped in bins of width
.25. The trend line gives the linear ﬁt. Error spikes indicate 95% conﬁdence
intervals..047.006 on January 30, 2018 01:50:06 AM
and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Volume 79 Number 4 October 2017 / 1285Canes-Wrone, Brandice, and Kenneth Shotts. 2004. “The Conditional Na-
ture of Presidential Responsiveness to Public Opinion.” American Jour-
nal of Political Science 48 (4): 690–706.
Canes-Wrone, Brandice, and Kenneth Shotts. 2007. “When Do Elections
Encourage Ideological Rigidity?” American Political Science Review 101
(2): 272–88.
Cho, In-Koo, and David M. Kreps. 1987. “Signaling Games and Stable
Equilibria.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 102 (2): 179–221.
Cohen, Jeffrey. 1999. Presidential Responsiveness and Public Policymaking:
The Public and the Polices That Presidents Choose. Ann Arbor: Uni-
versity of Michigan Press.
Colomer, Josep, and Humberto Llavador. 2011. “An Agenda-Setting Model
of Electoral Competition.” Journal of the Spanish Economic Association
3 (1): 73–93.
Conconi, Paola, Giovanni Facchini, and Maurizio Zanardi. 2014. “Policy-
makers’ Horizon and Trade Reforms: The Protectionist Effect of Elec-
tions.” Journal of International Economics 94 (1): 102–18.
Dragu, Tiberiu, and Xiaochen Fan. 2016. “An Agenda-Setting Model of
Electoral Competition.” Journal of Politics 78 (4): 1170–83.
Elling, Richard. 1982. “Ideological Change in the United States Senate: Time
and Electoral Responsiveness.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 7 (1): 75–92.
Fearon, James. 1999. “Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians:
Selecting Good Candidates versus Sanctioning Poor Performance.” In
Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes, and Bernard Manin, eds., Democ-
racy, Accountability, and Representation. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Fiorina, Morris, Saumel Adams, and Jeremy Pope. 2006. Culture War? The
Myth of a Polarized America. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Fox, Justin. 2007. “Government Transparency and Policymaking.” Public
Choice 131 (1–2): 23–44.
Fox, Justin, and Matthew Stephenson. 2011. “Judicial Review as a Response
to Political Posturing.” American Political Science Review 105 (2): 397–
414.
Fox, Justin, and Matthew Stephenson. 2015. “The Distributional Effects of
Minority Protective Judicial Review.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 27:
499–521.
Fox, Justin, and Richard Van Weelden. 2012. “Costly Transparency.” Jour-
nal of Public Economics 94 (9–10): 142–50.
Gentzkow, Matthew, and Jesse Shapiro. 2010. “What Drives Media Slant?
Evidence from US Daily Newspapers.” Econometrica 78 (1): 35–71.
Gentzkow, Matthew, Jesse Shapiro, and Matt Taddy. 2016. “Measuring
Polarization in High-Dimensional Data: Method and Application to
Congressional Speech.” Working paper no. 22423, National Bureau of
Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.
George, Lisa, and Joel Waldfogel. 2006. “The New York Times and the
Market for Local News.” American Economic Review 96 (1): 435–47.
Grimmer, Justin. 2013. “Appropriators Not Position Takers: The Distorting
Effects of Electoral Incentives on Congressional Representation.” Amer-
ican Journal of Political Science 57 (3): 624–42.
Hillygus, D. Sunshine, and Todd G. Shields. 2014. The Persuadable Voter:
Wedge Issues in Presidential Campaigns. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni-
versity Press.This content downloaded from 035.176
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms Holmstrom, Bengt, and Paul Milgrom. 1991. “Multitask Principal-Agent
Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design.”
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 7:24–52.
Jacobs, Lawrence, and Robert Shapiro. 2000. Politicians Don’t Pander: Po-
litical Manipulation and the Loss of Democratic Responsiveness. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Jensen, Jacob, Ethan Kaplan, Suresh Naidu, and Laurence Wilse-Samson.
2012. “Political Polarization and the Dynamics of Political Language:
Evidence from 130 Years of Partisan Speech.” Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity 43 (2): 1–81.
Kaiser, Robert. 2013. An Act of Congress: How America’s Essential Insti-
tution Works, and How It Doesn’t. New York: Knopf.
Koeneman, Keith. 2013. First Son: The Biography of Richard M. Daley.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Krasa, Stefan, and Mattias Polborn. 2015. “Political Competition in Leg-
islative Elections.” Working paper, University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign.
Kuklinski, James. 1978. “Representativeness and Elections: A Policy Anal-
ysis.” American Political Science Review 72 (1): 165–77.
Lowe, William, Ken Benoit, Slava Mikhaylov, and Michael Laver. 2011.
“Scaling Policy Preferences from Coded Political Texts.” Legislative
Studies Quarterly 36 (1): 123–55.
Maltzman, Forrest, and Lee Siegelman. 1996. “The Politics of Talk: Un-
constrained Floor Time in the U.S. House of Representatives.” Journal
of Politics 58 (3): 819–30.
Maskin, Eric, and Jean Tirole. 2004. “The Politician and the Judge.”American
Economic Review 94 (4): 1034–54.
Mattozzi, Andrea, and Erik Snowberg. 2015. “The Right Type of Legislator:
A Theory of Taxation and Representation.” Working paper, European
University Institute.
McCarty, Nolan, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. 2006. Polarized
America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
Morelli, Massimo, and Richard Van Weelden. 2013. “Ideology and In-
formation in Policymaking.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 25 (3): 412–
36.
Prat, Andrea. 2005. “The Wrong Kind of Transparency.” American Eco-
nomic Review 95 (3): 862–77.
Rottinghaus, Brandon. 2006. “Rethinking Presidential Responsiveness: The
Public Presidency and Rhetorical Congruence, 1953–2001.” Journal of
Politics 68 (3): 720–32.
Quinn, Kevin, Burt Monroe, Michael Colaresi, Michael Crespin, and Dra-
gomir Radev. 2010. “How to Analyze Political Attention with Minimal
Assumptions and Costs.” American Journal of Political Science 54 (1):
209–28.
Snyder, James, and David Stromberg. 2010. “Press Coverage and Political
Accountability.” Journal of Political Economy 118 (2): 355–408.
Thomas, Martin. 1985. “Election Proximity and Senatorial Roll Call Vot-
ing.” American Journal of Political Science 29 (1): 96–111.
Vlaicu, Razvan, and Alex Whalley. 2016. “Hierarchical Accountability in
Government: Theory and Evidence.” Journal of Public Economics 134
(1): 85–99..047.006 on January 30, 2018 01:50:06 AM
and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
